The aim of this essay is to show that the latter Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach opens up the possibility to a criticism of every foundational thought, that is to say, to the affirmation that the society it’s based on external-transcendental principles of society itself. This criticism goes to the pretended existence of a normative instance of the social, substantial and, therefore, divorced from the practices that constitutes society itself. In that regard, from an analysis of the “language-game” notion founded in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus, it describes the initial foundational position of Wittgenstein,this work revises the language-game concept and its implications for the construction of a criticism to the foundational thought, and it questions the pretended wittgesteinian “relativism” that come from the contingence and pluralism concepts, present on his last period. The text shows that the evident multiplicity of the language usages has as substrate many specific living forms, which don’t respond to a transcendental instance.
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- Foundational thought
- Human condition
- Language usage
- Tractatus logico-philosophicus